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Director of Central Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
30 August 1979

DOE review completed.

State Dept. review completed

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CHINA-VIETNAM: Talks and Atmospherics

The Chinese used the latest negotiating session to reiterate--this time for the benefit of the Nonaligned Summit in Havana next week--their position that the only legitimate Kampuchean government is the one headed by Pol Pot. The Chinese also promised to aid the anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea as long as Vietnam keeps troops there. The Chinese held out no hope of any progress toward peace or better relations with Hanoi until the Vietnamese cease their hostile policies toward China, withdraw from both Kampuchea and Laos, and stop armed provocations along the border. 25X1

Vietnam refused to discuss the situation in Kampuchea and Laos, arguing that changes that occurred earlier this year in Kampuchea are "irreversible." The Vietnamese also accused the Chinese of massing troops along the border where daily Chinese "incursions" into Vietnamese territory are said to be creating an "increasingly tense" situation. 25X1

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NATO: Theater Nuclear Force Mix

West German Chancellor Schmidt has given up trying to persuade NATO to deploy sea-launched cruise missiles, [redacted] *This virtually guarantees that the US-proposed force mix of Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles will comprise the theater nuclear force modernization package that NATO ministers will consider in December.* [redacted] 25X1

Schmidt had believed that the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles would be politically more acceptable than the deployment of the more visible ground-launched missiles. While the Dutch showed some interest, the Norwegians and Danes rejected Schmidt's proposal.

[redacted] 25X1

Schmidt reportedly was also concerned that by continuing to push for sea-launched missiles, he was raising doubts about his commitment to theater nuclear force modernization in general. He wants to get Norway and Denmark involved in NATO's nuclear defenses, however, and apparently intends to raise the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles again. He may wait until after the basic NATO theater nuclear modernization decision is made, probably at the end of the year. [redacted]

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FRANCE: Possible Defense Debate

French Defense Minister Bourges's speech this week supports recent speculation that a fundamental debate on French defense policy may be in the offing.

Bourges, a Gaullist moderate, explicitly linked France's defense and security policy to the rest of Europe and stated that participation in Europe's defense is thus one of the French Army's essential missions. While these statements reflect official French thinking on European defense and France's relationship with NATO, other Gaullists and Communists have already announced their opposition. 25X1

President Giscard may echo Bourges's theme in a major address scheduled for mid-September, and thus add further fuel to the debate. Giscard abandoned a similar initiative in 1976 for fear that opposition by his Gaullist coalition partners would weaken the government's position at the polls. With the Gaullists significantly weakened by the results of the European Parliamentary elections last June, Giscard may believe that the time has come to bring defense policy issues into the public arena. 25X1

For several years an unpublicized interministerial group has been studying future options for France's nuclear forces. Paris is concerned that the rising costs of nuclear weaponry will force a difficult choice between the modernization of its deterrent and the modernization of its conventional forces. The French Parliament is likely to address these issues later this fall when it considers the 1980 defense budget and evaluates its five-year defense plan, covering the period of 1977 through 1981. 25X1

In recent months a series of articles and books in France has expressed concern that the American nuclear commitment to Europe is weakening at a time when American diplomacy is increasingly difficult to calculate. Some unofficial French commentators conclude that France, West Germany, and Britain should consider ways to construct a European nuclear deterrent in order to ensure Europe's defense. 25X1

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

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USSR-SWEDEN: Floating Drydock

Accidental damage has delayed delivery to the USSR of one of the world's largest floating drydocks. The 80,000-ton lift capacity dock, being built at Gothenborg, Sweden, will be the only one in the Soviet Northern Fleet area capable of handling the carrier Kiev, and is only part of a more general improvement in Soviet naval ship maintenance capability.

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Despite severe damage over a reported 1,200-square-meter area of the dock's hull--incurred during pre-acceptance tests at Gothenborg in mid-August--the shipyard apparently still hopes to deliver the dock to Murmansk

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After mid-September there will be an increasing chance of severe weather during the 2,400 kilometers, two-to-three-week delivery voyage, and the trip might have to be delayed until spring. Late delivery could disrupt the Kiev's maintenance schedule and might affect its operations during spring exercises in 1980.

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USSR-IRAQ: Relations

Moscow's unusually sharp rebuke of a recent article that appeared in Iraq's official Baath Party newspaper criticizing Soviet policy in the Red Sea area reflects Soviet consternation about its inability to improve ties with Baghdad. 25X1

After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Soviets tried to exploit Iraqi opposition to the accord by demonstrating renewed interest in closer economic and military ties. A visit by the Iraqi Chief of Staff to Moscow in June may have paved the way for a new Soviet-Iraqi arms deal; 25X1

Iraq's efforts to stop the Soviet-backed South Yemeni Government's incursion into North Yemen in February and the repression of the Iraqi Communist Party have continued to hinder the establishment of closer ties. There are even some indications that Baghdad believes the Soviets had been in contact with recently convicted non-Communist antiregime members of the Iraqi Government. 25X1 25X1

Iraqi leaders apparently also believe the Soviets are involved with both the Iraqi Communists and the Kurds and are attempting to foment unrest in northern Iraq. Baghdad has severely restricted Communist activities in Iraq. The Soviets publicly have been circumspect about Baghdad's harsh anti-Communist policies to avoid further antagonizing the Iraqis.

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USSR: Farm Fuel Shortages

New evidence suggests that the nationwide embargo on nonessential rail freight in the Soviet Union, in effect the last two weeks of July, was precipitated by fear that the grain harvest would be crippled by shortfalls in delivery of fuel. 25X1

Farm fuel use generally quadruples during the peak harvest in July and August, and the consumption of farm fuel has been growing faster than overall oil consumption since 1975 because of the increased use of large-scale mechanized equipment. In July, rail workers defaulted on the delivery of 10,000 tank cars of diesel fuel for farm use. Soviet authorities also reported a 20- to 40-percent shortfall in gasoline and diesel deliveries during July. Since agriculture takes precedence in summer fuel allocations even over the military, this failure of the Soviet rail system at a critical time points up the strain that still prevails in rail transport.

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

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INDONESIA: Refugees in East Timor

The International Red Cross has appealed to 15 countries for immediate cash and medical supplies for East Timor, where Indonesian military operations have displaced an estimated 60,000 persons over the past three years. Some 20,000 Timorese, according to the Red Cross mission, are near starvation. Continued military operations against pro-independence Fretilin rebels have increased the number of refugees fleeing from the mountains to more populated areas. 25X1

The Red Cross is asking for approximately $7 million in addition to the $1.3 million already pledged. The Indonesian invasion in 1975 and unexpectedly strong Fretilin resistance since then have so severely dislocated the economy that serious underproduction of food crops has resulted in food shortages in much of the province. The economic infrastructure, always substandard, is in disarray, and transportation facilities are virtually nonexistent. The Indonesian Government 25X1
recognizes that it is unable to feed the population of its newest province. Jakarta's recent decision to allow foreign observers to assess the deteriorating situation in Timor evidently was taken in order to improve its prospects for obtaining international assistance.

The Indonesian Army plans to create some 150 re- 25X1
settlement centers near the coast for refugees now scattered in receiving centers around the province. The refugees will be given tools, clothing, and building materials, plus a dose of Indonesian language and political orientation.

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INTERNATIONAL: Law of the Sea Talks

The eighth session of the Law of the Sea Conference, which ended last Friday in New York, revised a number of draft treaty articles that better protect certain seabed mining interests of the industrialized countries. These new articles move the conference closer to its goal of producing a final draft convention during the ninth session, scheduled to convene in March 1980. More work, however, has to be done to improve other parts of the seabed mining text to make the entire package acceptable to the US and other developed countries.

The most significant changes involved voting procedures in the Council, the decisionmaking arm of the proposed International Seabed Authority. A new draft article calls for special voting procedures that would protect, better than the existing text, the vital economic interests of industrialized states, which will be in a minority on the 36-member Council.

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The article establishes varying levels of voting majorities keyed to the importance of the subjects under consideration. For the most sensitive questions--such as approval of mining contracts--decisions would be adopted by a two-thirds majority, provided a specific number of states, still to be settled, do not cast negative votes. The ultimate acceptance of this system will depend on agreement on the number of states needed for the blocking minority and the subjects requiring a special voting regime.

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The New York session also produced a compromise formula that liberalizes the regime for the conduct of marine scientific research on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles, and a new article on the financial terms of contracts between the Seabed Authority and mining firms that lessens the tax burden on prospective seabed mining companies.

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USSR-CHINA-US: Public Reaction to Mondale Trip

The Soviets have thus far said little about Vice President Mondale's current visit to China. Radio Moscow's treatment of the story has been brief and unemotional, with reference in passing to alleged US "connivance" with China against Vietnam. 25X1

Soviet reticence to comment on the visit might also reflect recent movement toward the opening of new political talks between the USSR and China. Press reports from Beijing assert that the USSR last Friday handed China a note proposing that the talks open in Moscow between 18 and 20 September. As yet we have no further reporting on what progress may have been made toward formulating a mutually agreeable agenda for the talks.

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ECUADOR-CUBA: Diplomatic Relations

Ecuador and Cuba last weekend announced that they have reestablished diplomatic relations after a 17-year hiatus. The resumption of ties--which had been rumored for several months--reflects the decision of Ecuador's newly inaugurated civilian President, Jaime Roldos, to have his country play a more active role in hemispheric affairs following seven and a half years of military rule. There apparently was little opposition within the Ecuadorean military, which had approved a resumption of consular relations with Cuba before it relinquished power on 10 August.

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IRAN: Kurdish Situation

Kurdish Democratic Party leaders in Mahabad yesterday vowed to continue fighting despite a reported agreement between a Kurdish delegation in Tehran and the government. The delegation had yielded to Ayatollah Khomeini's demand that government military forces assume control of security in the city of Mahabad. The delegation's negotiations with the government appear to have contributed to the recent lull in the fighting in Kurdish areas. The rejection of the agreement by the Kurdish Democratic Party leaders, however, indicates that the delegation lacked the authority to commit important Kurdish groups to a policy of accommodation with Tehran and Qom. The chances for continuing turmoil in the Kurdish areas will remain high.

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ISRAEL: Compensation for Higher Prices

In a move symptomatic of the chaotic state of Israeli economic policymaking, Tel Aviv has agreed to compensate wage earners for the cost-of-living impact of the government's recent cuts in subsidies on basic commodities. This almost certainly will ensure a triple-digit inflation rate through the end of 1979. The government and the Histadrut, Israel's largest labor organization, have agreed to increase wages in September to compensate for the expected 3.5-percent price rise resulting from the subsidy cuts; the Histadrut is asking for a 6-percent wage hike. A joint committee has been set up to work out the actual size of the wage increase, and a compromise is expected soon. Wages will rise again in October when the regular semiannual cost-of-living adjustment occurs.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: The Havana Summit

The Nonaligned Summit in Havana next week will for the first time be under the chairmanship of a country tied economically and politically to the USSR. Cuba hopes to use its position to nudge the Nonaligned Movement toward a more active role on the world scene and toward a more pro-Soviet stance. As the Movement's nominal leader until the next summit three years from now, Cuba will have some leverage. It will not make major advances toward its goals, however, because the membership is too broad and disparate for any one member to effect dramatic changes in the organization's role and direction. Also, most members will resist Cuban efforts to tilt the Movement's policies toward Moscow.

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Cuba does not accept the philosophy of the founders of the Nonaligned Movement who saw it as an independent force dissociated from the two superpower blocs. Instead, Cuba postulates a "natural alliance" between the Movement and the USSR. Yugoslavia, the main defender of the Movement's founding principles, is leading the effort to prevent Cuba from imposing its brand of nonalignment on the Movement.

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The disagreement over the basic orientation of the Movement focused on the original 75-page Cuban draft of a summit declaration. Many members were surprised by the draft's obvious pro-Soviet character and its general indictment of the entire range of US and Western foreign policy. The low-key approach Cuba adopted at preparatory meetings in Belgrade last year and in Colombo in June had lulled members into thinking that Cuba had moderated its tactics.

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Cuba's aim in producing the draft was probably to provide room for "give" in subsequent negotiations. It

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declared its willingness to accept revisions and probably will not insist on imposing its philosophy at the risk of dividing the Movement. The initial Havana draft, however, so aroused the suspicions of the moderates that they are approaching the summit in an aggressive mood.

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Yugoslavia and India, in close contact with almost half the membership, prepared major revisions to the Cuban draft, which should be reflected in a new draft declaration. The Yugoslavs are concentrating more on eliminating the draft's endorsement of Soviet philosophy than on erasing its anti-Western tone, and much anti-Western rhetoric will survive.

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Debate on Structure

The loose institutional machinery of the Movement vests considerable power in its chairman, who heads the Coordinating Bureau between summits, initiates most drafts, and prepares agendas. Yugoslavia has sought several institutional changes aimed at curbing the power of Cuba, the chairman for the next three years. It wants a clearer definition of the functions of the Bureau chairman, enlargement of the Bureau to allow more regional representation, and full participation of all members in decisionmaking. The group tasked to study the issue has agreed on little but to increase Bureau membership from 25 to 35. Most members agree that some changes are necessary, but they are opposed to institutionalizing the Movement's procedures. Some structural alterations will probably be accepted, but no drastic changes are likely.

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Divisive Issues

Bilateral disputes between members, added together, heighten tension, but debated individually they do not generally threaten to split the Movement. This year, however, two issues do have divisive potential--the Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

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The conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea, besides involving two members, brings the Sino-Soviet rivalry into the Movement. Many of the nonaligned see Vietnam's imposition of a puppet regime in Kampuchea as a Soviet attempt to exert its influence by proxy in Southeast Asia. 25X1

China and the USSR have been lobbying their friends in the Movement on behalf of the rival Kampuchean governments. Cuba invited the pro-Vietnamese Heng Samrin government, but also issued visas to representatives of the Pol Pot government that is backed by China. A dispute over credentials flared on Tuesday in the preparatory meetings. Cuba and Vietnam said the foreign ministers or the summit itself should decide the representation question. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore called for the immediate seating of Pol Pot's representatives. Debate by the heads of state will probably be quite heated but, in the end, members may sidestep the issue by not seating either delegation until a clearer picture of the situation in Kampuchea emerges. 25X1

Egypt's conclusion of a peace treaty with Israel poses a special problem for the Movement. As one of the four founding states, Egypt has always enjoyed a privileged position fully congruent with the members' solid support for the Arab states against Israel. Now, that congruence no longer exists. 25X1

Soon after the peace agreement, the other Arab states opened a campaign to expel Egypt from the Nonaligned Movement. So far, they have not met with much success. The Africans have refused to go along, and many other members including Cuba are concerned that the expulsion of Egypt would create a dangerous precedent. The Arab states may raise the expulsion issue but are likely to push more for the condemnation of Egypt and the peace accords. 25X1

Economic issues also will be debated in Havana. The developing countries are disappointed with the results of the fifth UN Conference on Trade and Development, disunited over the energy issue, and confused over what

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course to take in future negotiations with the industrialized nations. Several members hope that the Summit will focus on economic issues in order to redefine the economic demands of the developing countries, restore their solidarity, and reassert the primacy of the Nonaligned Movement over the Group of 77 as the leading developing country spokesman on economic issues.

Prospects

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The outcome of the Summit should provide a fairly clear idea of the direction of the Nonaligned Movement during the three-year Cuban chairmanship. So far, the response to the Cuban draft declaration suggests that Havana can at most achieve only limited advances toward its goals. The advantages Cuba will gain from its chairmanship will not be great enough to overcome the constraints imposed by the genuinely nonaligned posture of most members and by their differences on specific questions.

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The anticolonial traditions of the Movement mean that many of its declarations will have an anti-Western tone. Few members, however, are willing to permit the Movement to become an exclusively anti-Western forum. Still less are they prepared to make it a pro-Soviet organization.

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Cuba's efforts to have the Movement play a more active role on the world scene will be hampered by the great diversity of interests among its members, who have continually resisted any institutional strengthening that might allow the Movement to transcend these differences.

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Cuba's Goals

Cuba will use its chairmanship of the Movement to try to increase Havana's role generally in international affairs. It will try to win a UN Security Council seat this fall and an invitation to be host for the next meeting of the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1982 or 1983.

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Perhaps Cuba's primary goal is to use the Movement to exert leverage on the US. Cuban President Fidel Castro believes the US, if it is subjected to enough pressure from world public opinion, will choose to negotiate outstanding bilateral issues with Cuba. He is optimistic that, if he can exploit his opportunities effectively, he will see in time the end of the US economic "blockade" and the return of the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay to Cuba. He may even think he can eventually force Puerto Rican independence.

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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the Intelligence Community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

South Africa

The ruling National Party retained two seats contested in parliamentary byelections yesterday, but in both contests its majorities were cut significantly compared to the voting in 1977. The party retains a commanding lead of some 130 of the 165 parliamentary seats, but the by-election results suggest considerable voter discontent over disclosures made in the "slush fund" scandal involving the government's now-disbanded Information Department, according to a Western news report.

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Ghana

The Revolutionary Council has sentenced 12 officers to jail terms of up to 25 years for corruption, according to a Ghana radio report yesterday. Six other officers were discharged from the Army but not imprisoned, and the assets of all the convicted men were confiscated.

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Somalia

Radio Mogadishu reported yesterday that last Saturday the electorate overwhelmingly approved a new constitution that will restore elections and a parliament. A Western news account said that the new constitution will replace the one suspended in 1969 when President Siad took power in a military coup. Military rule officially ended in 1976 but since that time military leaders have dominated the sole political party.

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Ethiopia-Somalia

Guerrilla commanders of the Western Somali Liberation Front claim to have defeated Ethiopian and Cuban forces in the Ethiopian-ruled Ogaden region, according to a Western news service. The guerrillas said some 700 Cuban-led Ethiopians attacked one of their strongholds some 50 kilometers southwest of Hargeisa on Sunday but were forced to retreat yesterday.

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